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Abstract
– deutsch –
In Venezuela, einem lateinamerikanischen 
Rentierstaat, stieg die Zahl der Totschläge 
pro 100.000 Einwohner von 11 im Jahr 1983 
auf 44 im Jahr 2002. In meiner Dissertation 
wird untersucht, warum sich diese signifi-
kante Steigerung der sozialen Gewalt nach 
den 1970er Jahren ereignet. Zu diesem 
Zweck wird eine Analyse der Beziehung 
zwischen Slumentwicklung und dem Wei-
chen von Institutionen der sozialen Kont-
rolle vorgenommen werden. Dieser Artikel 
beschreibt den konzeptionellen Rahmen 
um diesen Kausalzusammenhang zu be-
legen. Die Hypothese meines Forschungs-
vorhabens ist, dass der rasante Übergang 
in die Moderne (die Land-Stadt-Migration) 
eine normfreie Zone entstehen ließ. Der 
Artikel endet mit der Überprüfung der 
vorläufigen Methodik, die in meiner Dis-
sertation die oben genannte Hypothese zu 
negieren oder zu bestätigen sucht.
– englisch –
Venezuela, a Latin American rentier state, 
went from experiencing 11 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants in 1983 to 44 in 2002. 
My dissertation project examines why this 
significant increase in social violence took 
place by analysing the relationship between 
slum development and the withering of in-
stitutions of social control in the country 
after the 1970s. This article however only 
discusses the conceptual framework be-
hind the dwindling of institutions of social 
control. The hypothesis of this article (and 
that of my dissertation) is that a Durkheim-
ian anomic gap was fomented in the Ven-
ezuelan slums because transition to mo-
dernity (rural-to-urban migration) did not 
allow recreating institutions that promoted 
norms of social interaction, which reduce 
the possibility of violent conflict between 
people. It concludes by reviewing the ten-
tative methodology that will be applied in 
my dissertation to confirm or dismiss the 
aforementioned hypothesis. 
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Introduction
The Caribbean country of Venezuela has 
seen its homicide rate quadrupled during 
the period of 1983 to 2002. The Venezue-
lan homicide rate, measured as the num-
ber of intentional homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants, rose from 11 in 1983 to 44 in 
2002 (Briceño-Leon 2006: 319). In recent 
years, the country’s homicide rate has been 
amongst the highest in the world and is 
higher than in the conflict-ridden nation 
of Iraq (Leon 2010: 3). My forthcoming 
doctoral dissertation explores the causal 
link between the often-overlooked spatial 
relationship between the development of 
informal urban settlements  –  commonly 
referred to as slums – and the formal city 
after the 1970s.1 I argue that in the space of 
urban slums rent-financed growth caused 
the negative performance of institutions of 
social control over the last three decades, 
which explains the rise of social violence. 
In this piece however I would primarily 
focus on discussing the conceptual frame-
work behind the dependent variable of my 
ongoing research and its spatial dynamics.
Social violence is found with greater in-
tensity in urban centres. The homicide 
rate in Caracas, the Venezuelan capital, is 
twice the rate of the national average (Uni-
ted Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: 
2013).2 The high presence of poverty is 
an often-cited cause mentioned in the 
current literature accounting for rise of 
violence (DiJohn 2005: 108-10; Sanchez 
2006: 178–180). However, the Venezuelan 
capital possesses less impoverished inhabi-
tants – only around 21% of its inhabitants 
live below the poverty line – than small Ve-
1 My doctoral dissertation is as of date entitled The 
Political Economy of Violence in Venezuela and is 
being developed at the Institute of Political Sci-
ence of Leipzig University, and supervised by 
Prof. Dr. Heidrun Zinecker.
2 The latest comparable with available statistics was 
2009. That year the UNODC reported that the 
homicide rate in Caracas was of 122 per 100,000 
inhabitants, while the national average stood at 49 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
nezuelan countryside populations. These 
small population centres, which are those 
that possess less than 25,000 inhabitants, 
show an absolute poverty rate of around 
61% (Gonzalez 2005: 114). The develop-
ment of the urban area in the Venezuelan 
context could account for the rise of social 
violence. While these dynamics are context 
specific as in many other countries such as 
Egypt, Nicaragua, or Peru, slum growth has 
not resulted in high social violence. I argue 
that in the Venezuelan context the specific 
growth of slums in an oil-based economy 
has withered traditional institutions of so-
cial control (forthcoming). 
Slum Development
Before discussing the conceptual frame-
work behind the withering of institutions 
of social control in Venezuela it is impor-
tant to briefly discuss the dynamics of rent-
led slum growth. The relationship between 
informal settlements known as slums and 
the formal city in Venezuela is a contras-
ting one. The slum and the formal city have 
a difficult interaction and problematic co-
habitation processes. A slum is not cha-
racterised by its appearance, the defining 
factor can be rather found in its relational 
dynamics to the formal city. The inhabi-
tants of a slum are not fully integrated in 
the economic and social life of the city 
(Stokes 1962: 188). 
This means that although slums are not 
part of the formal urban centre, they are 
neither considered as a part of the rural 
areas. Slums are pseudo-cities in the mar-
gins of a formal city (Leon forthcoming). 
It is important to note that it was rural-
to-urban migration that caused the creati-
on of these informal settlements. In many 
third world countries, including Venezuela, 
rural-to-urban migration took place in the 
second part of the 20th century. Once rural 
migrants arrived in the city they became 
slum dwellers instead of city dwellers be-
cause they did not have the necessary skills 
to integrate into the urban economy. Rural 
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ing the local currency, which encourages 
imports over domestic production. Also, 
it overheats the domestic economy with 
inflationary pressures because oil rents 
create demand without supply (Auty 1993: 
3–5). Therefore, in a rentier state income 
rises due to inflation, because of the large 
amount of money being pumped into the 
economy by oil windfalls. This encourages 
rural-to-urban migration since migrants 
are encouraged by the perceived prospects 
of higher income rather than the real pos-
sibilities of acquiring high-paying employ-
ment (Torado 1980: 364). Naturally, formal 
employment falls in cities located in rentier 
states such as Venezuela because labour in-
tensive industries are crowded out. Thus, 
the ability for savings accumulation by the 
incoming rural migrants is severely hinde-
red, which does not allow for their integ-
ration into the formal city and turns them 
into slum dwellers (forthcoming). 
Furthermore, it is in the spatial category 
of the slum where social violence has de-
veloped and became Venezuela’s number 
one concern (Moreno 2009: 869–870; Fox/
Hoelscher 2010: 6; International Crisis 
Group 2009: 6). My doctoral dissertation 
will test one main hypothesis, which is why 
the growth of slums has withered traditi-
onal institutions of social control brought 
by rural migrants to the city (including, 
but not limited to, the family, the school, 
and the church), which removed normative 
controls on human behaviour (Leon Forth-
coming). The following section will expand 
on the conceptual framework behind ins-
titutions of social control and the process 
that leads to its dwindling.
The Withering of Institutions of Social 
Control
Institutions of social control are those that 
create what Robert Putnam termed soci-
al capital, which are the social networks 
that foster trust and cooperation within a 
given community. Social capital is a fun-
damental element that allows for the in-
economies are labour intensive because 
they are overwhelmingly dependent on 
primary sectors, such as agricultural pro-
duction. On the other hand, urban econo-
mies are capital intensive because they rely 
primarily on the service sector. One has to 
keep in mind that urbanisation in the third 
world during the 20th century was different 
from urbanisation in that of the first world 
during the 18th and 19th century because 
it was not driven by the process of indust-
rialisation (Cornelius Jr. 1969: 833; Lipton 
1977: 58; Stokes 1962: 190). 
In first world cases, primarily Europe, 
industrialisation-driven urbanisation al-
lowed for the integration of the rural mi-
grants since industrial jobs are labour in-
tensive. In Europe the new city dwellers of 
the 18th and 19th century were able to find 
formal employment in the industrialising 
cities and they had the possibility to gene-
rate savings (Marx/Stoker/Tavneet 2013: 
187–189). The possibility of savings accu-
mulation is what allows for investment in 
what is usually the only resource available 
to rural migrants: their own labour. This 
means investing in their education, nutri-
tion, health, and housing unit (Frankenhoff 
1967: 29). This process did not take place in 
many third world countries during the 20th 
century. Venezuela was of course no excep-
tion. In fact, the economic structure of this 
Caribbean country increased the inability 
of rural migrants to accumulate savings in 
the city, thus making them slum dwellers 
(Leon forthcoming).
Venezuela, a major oil exporter, fits the 
rentier state model formulated by Giacomo 
Luciani and Hazem Beblawi (1987:  12).3 
Dependency on oil windfalls produces 
detrimental macroeconomic effects such 
as the “Dutch disease.” This effect renders 
the labour intensive sectors of an economy, 
such as agriculture and manufacturing, in-
ternationally uncompetitive by overvalu-
3 Venezuelan oil revenues constitute well over 8% 
of GDP, more than 40% of total exports and more 
than 40% of the national budget.
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ternalisation of social norms that regulate 
human behaviour (Putnam/Leonardi/Na-
netti 1993:  167; Putnam 1994: 6–9). The 
aforementioned institutions are termed 
as “traditional” because they existed in a 
rural setting. One could expect that these 
institutions would transfer along with the 
rural migrant to the new urban setting and 
continue their role of imparting normative 
controls over human behaviour. However, 
in the Venezuelan case the transition to 
modernity (referring to rural-to-urban mi-
gration) did not allow for these traditional 
institutions to be carried over and achieve 
their role of creating and enforcing social 
rules and norms that interrupt violence. 
Karl Marx (1969) and Max Weber (1930) 
explained that the transition to modernity 
is always disruptive of traditional institu-
tions. Modern social scientists have iden-
tified that the reason that this transition 
is disruptive is because in a modern (i.e. 
urban) environment social relations are no 
longer based on nepotism because people 
are exposed to a much greater number of 
non-kin. Therefore, a successful transition 
to modernity involves the rebuilding of so-
cial networks that are composed by large 
number of individuals with no kinship ties 
(Newson/Richerson 2009: 130). European 
societies were able to successfully transition 
to modernity because nation-state formati-
on allowed for new social capital to replace 
traditional social norms, which allowed for 
social cohesion and normative institutions 
to remain present (Fox/Hoelscher 2010: 
3–4). My dissertation argues that in the Ve-
nezuelan transition to modernity the inde-
pendent causal variable – rent-based urban 
development – inhibited redeveloping new 
social capital in the informal settlements, 
and thus new institutions of social control.
As Norbert Elias explained, nation-state 
formation in Europe allowed for a trickle 
down of norms of social behaviour dic-
tated by the interaction of the bourgeoi-
sie and the proletariat. This means that 
an independent civil society interacts at 
the socio-economic level under the spati-
al framework of the nascent nation-state 
(Fox/Hoelscher 2010: 3–4). In a rentier 
state however, an independent civil society 
is not present because the different social 
classes have a clientelistic relationship to 
the state and not a mutually beneficial in-
terest-based one between them (Ross 2001: 
327–328). A civil society requires a market 
economy where intensive capitalist growth 
takes place in order for the bourgeoisie-
proletariat interaction to take place as an 
independent socio-economic agent. This 
cannot take place in a rentier economy be-
cause demand does not result from surplus 
value of proletariat production created out 
of bourgeois investment, but from the dis-
tribution of natural resource exports. In 
other words, rents create demand without 
supply, which does not allow for intensive 
capitalist growth to take place (Zinecker 
2007: 9). Thus, a civil society that can ge-
nerate social capital is unlikely to form. 
Many rentier states, such as those found 
in the Middle East, have not been able to 
develop independent civil societies due to 
the above-mentioned process, but this has 
not resulted in heightened social violence 
rate. One can speculate that the transition 
to modernity in the Middle Eastern rentier 
states did not significantly alter traditional 
institutions that generated social capital. 
This speculation is made because in these 
cases, and unlike the Venezuelan case, so-
cial disorganisation, the opposite of social 
capital, is not apparent.
Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay 
(1942) explained that their empirical re-
search showed that precarious environ-
mental conditions did not allow social 
networks of cooperation to rise to a si-
gnificant level where they could create 
normative controls on human behaviour. 
Social disorganisation engenders what 
Emile Durkheim (1960: 343) referred to 
as the state of anomie, which is a state of 
normlessness resulting from an abnormal 
social division of labour where social soli-
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darity (trust and cooperation) and cohe-
sion cannot develop. Modern sociologists 
argue that slum-dwellers suffer from an 
“anomic gap” since they live in pseudo-
cities where social capital has not pro-
perly redeveloped (Cornelius  Jr. 1969: 
833–834).4 This increases the likelihood 
that violence will be used as a conflict re-
solution and market access tool because 
social disorganisation decreases disincen-
tives against violent crime (Ehrlich 1974: 
70–71; Rosenfeld/Messner/Baumer 2001: 
286-287). However, the theory behind the 
above-mentioned hypothesis needs to be 
empirically tested in order to back the the-
oretical framework discussed in this piece.
An Inconclusive Conclusion
Many scholars have tried to explain the 
dramatic rise of social violence in Vene-
zuela.5 What makes my study novel is the 
focus on the social, political and economic 
dynamics in the development of the Vene-
zuelan urban space. In order to prove, or 
disprove, the above-stated hypothesis, the 
theory needs to be tested against empiri-
cal findings. The tentative methodology to 
accomplish this goal is the study of slum 
growth in the three most violent Vene-
zuelan cities with more than one million 
inhabitants. These three metropolises are 
4 Emile Durkheim (1960: 343) explained the con-
cept of the state of anomie as normlessness. This 
means a period of time, within a given space, whe-
re social rules do not govern and regulate men’s 
actions.
5 Violence, as a complex social phenomenon, is of 
course caused by multiple factors. In the Ven-
ezuelan case many scholars have tried to at-
tribute deterministic explanations to the genesis 
of violence that include, but are not limited to, 
structural adjustment programs, the high avail-
ability of small arms, the international cocaine 
trade, and demographic dynamics (Leon Forth-
coming). However, all of these variables are cer-
tainly intervening factors, but not necessarily 
deterministic ones in the specific context of Ven-
ezuela. In my dissertation I explain in greater de-
tail why causality cannot be attributed to these 
variables.
Caracas, Guyana City, and Barquisimeto.6 
Adding rural-to-urban migration, the na-
tural rate of increase and the growth – or 
lack thereof – of the non-rentier economy 
from 1970 onwards would quantify slum 
development (Leon forthcoming). Then, 
these findings will be qualitatively corre-
lated with the (under)development of ins-
titutions of social control during the same 
time frame. This will be achieved by ana-
lyzing their effectiveness through expert 
interviews, community leader interviews, 
and institutional case studies. I will focus 
formal institutions of social control – such 
as the educational system, the church, and 
public institutions.7 Employing the descri-
bed methodological and theoretical frame-
work, I will be able to test the relationship 
between rent-financed urbanisation and 
withering institutions of social control as 
the cause for the rise of social violence.
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